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pledges his own administration for four years, and the treaties would run but one year longer. If they should be found after five years of trial to be so dreadfully dangerous as Senator Bacon and his friends fear, it would be a very easy thing to modify them before extending them for another period.

Some Senators persist in saying that they will not allow the treaties to pass until so amended that each particular agreement to refer a case to the Hague Court shall be first submitted to the Senate for its ratification. This is a singular position to take in regard to treaties which specify in advance the kind of cases to be submitted to arbitration. It proceeds on the assumption that the State Department is not to be trusted, and that it would not be capable, with the advice and counsel of all the eminent legal talent that it employs, of deciding between questions of a judicial order and those affecting the so-called essential interests and honor of the nation.

To agree in advance to refer to the Hague Court controversies, the reference of which must again be agreed upon at the time when they arise, is to agree to nothing at all, and we confess that we would rather see the treaties openly rejected than adopted in this ridiculous form, in which, of course, they could never be ratified by other self-respecting nations. We refuse to believe that the Senate will allow itself to be betrayed into any such stultifying action, and we still hold to our first faith that the treaties will be ratified and our country thereby restored to its normal place in the greatest movement of our time.

The Eastern War and the Theories of John de Bloch.

Our readers are aware of the extraordinary interest awakened by the publication eight years ago of "The Future of War" by the eminent Polish economist and financier, John de Bloch. The theories of the future of war contained in his great six-volume work, with its critical analysis of military processes, were soon widely accepted by many advanced internationalists, and it was confidently expected that his reasonings were to be the chief hammers with which the whole war-system was to be beaten in pieces.

It is well known that his work had large influence on the Czar of Russia in inducing him to issue the call for the Hague Conference. Mr. Bloch, who was alive at the time of the Boer war, believed, and published the view in pamphlets, that that conflict had in certain important respects proved the essential correctness of his contention that war between first-class powers had become impossible, unless they were prepared to face either inevitable bankruptcy and ruin, or entire failure to obtain what they sought by arms.

We confess that Mr. Bloch's reasonings, profound

and exhaustive as they were, never seemed to us as conclusive as he thought them to be. He did not take sufficiently into account the changed methods which warfare with the new weapons and deadly explosives might have been expected to adopt. His conclusions were certainly valid for warfare in the old way. But the changes in the art of fighting have been as great as those in the character of the weapons, and for many of these he did not make proper allowance; in fact, he does not seem to have suspected some of them.

The South African war, too, was fought under conditions altogether too unique to furnish safe conclusions for a conflict between first-class powers.

Bloch seems also to have overlooked one of the plainest lessons of history, that the invention of new and more deadly weapons has never had any appreciable effect in preventing war. The prophecies of this kind — and they have been many since the invention of gunpowder — have all proved false. The improved weapons have been met by new devices and tactics for counteracting their destructiveness, and the courage of armies has never faltered before them.

It is too early yet to say that the Russo-Japanese war, the first great war fought under the new conditions, will discredit every one of Mr. Bloch's positions. But so far it has certainly given them little or no support. The deadliness of the weapons has had no deterrent effect upon the troops on either side. Men have never marched to battle or made assaults with greater readiness. Nor has it had any influence in restraining the governments at home from sending their citizens to slaughter by tens of thousands. There is no reason to believe that if the war were between any of the great powers of the West, — Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, for example, — either the soldiers or the governments would have behaved at all differently from those of Japan and Russia.

Nor, again, have the engagements so far, either at Port Arthur or in the interior, proved that one man on the defensive is equal to ten, or five, or even two, on the offensive. The war has demonstrated the extraordinary effectiveness, under modern conditions, of flanking movements, even with a moderate superiority of numbers, to a degree which Mr. Bloch does not seem to have suspected. It has shown also that frontal attacks, because they are made in open formation, are not at all so deadly as he figured out that they would be. Even fighting with the bayonet has not been rendered impossible.

Nor on the financial side does the war, though it has now been in progress a year, show any apparent symptoms of breaking down. The sources of supply at home have not been seriously interfered with by the mobilization and withdrawal of the large armies. This mobilization, on the part of Japan at least, has been, in proportion to her population, of the very

kind which Mr. Bloch had in mind. There has been likewise no indication of the breakdown of the credit of either nation. Russia's credit was thought to be strained to the breaking point at the outbreak of the conflict. But she can borrow money to-day about as easily and at the same rate of interest as a year ago. The same is of course true of Japan. The modern system of carrying on war on borrowed capital seems to be capable of indefinite extension, so that the day of ultimate financial collapse after the outbreak of a great war must be placed much further along than Mr. Bloch imagined.

In one particular his prophecy seems more likely to come true. He believed that under modern conditions no war between really first-class powers could be fought to a decision, but that a point of exhaustion and impossibility of making further headway on either side, against the formidable resistance offered, would be reached when the belligerents would be compelled to stop and settle their quarrel either by negotiation or by inviting the good offices of some neutral power. But even this contention may turn out to be false. It is based on an assumed practical equality in forces, in facility of recruiting and sending new troops to the front, in skill in handling armies, in reach and destructiveness of weapons, in loyalty to country, etc. A considerable difference in even one or two of these elements may make it easily possible for one of the combatants to win a decisive victory and compel the other to sue for peace.

It seems, then, already fairly clear that we cannot hope to receive much immediate aid from the contentions of Mr. Bloch toward the abolition of war. Of course, in time, the military and naval establishments, if continued and increased, will grow so burdensome upon the peoples as to completely pauperize and exhaust them, as Mr. Bloch pointed out in a most impressive way. But there seems to reside somewhere a marvelous power of staving off this evil day.

We must, then, in our efforts to suppress war, continue to rely in the main on the appeal to reason, to conscience, to humanity, to economy, to the solidarity of human interests, to human capacity for goodness, for mutual helpfulness, etc. It is along these lines that the effective work of the past has been done and the substantial victories for peace gained. It is useless to hope that war will accommodate us by abolishing itself and enabling us to reach perpetual peace by some unexpected short cut. Arbitration itself, which has recently made such wonderful progress, means so much precisely because there is behind it a large undergrowth of better acquaintance among the nations, of mutual goodwill and respect, of willingness to help and be helped, of love of justice and fairness, and of law and order, of the sense of solidarity of interests, of conviction that war is essentially opposed to all that is most noble and worthy

in human nature and society. It is in the advancement of these sentiments and principles, and of the policies and institutions which grow out of them, that war is to be crowded out of the world. It will become impossible in fact only as it becomes impossible in conscience and thought and feeling and wish and purpose of the commanding majority of the men and women of the world.

A Land Full of Violence, but of Hope.

The events of the last month in Russia, the strikes, the massacres by the Cossacks, the riots of the frenzied masses, have again turned the eyes of all the civilized world to that unfortunate empire. Men everywhere have been asking themselves, Has the revolution at last come? Will the old régime now give way? Is freedom for the Russian people from the oppressive domination of the military oligarchy dawning? Is it to be another French revolution?

These and many similar questions show what an enormous amount of interest is everywhere taken in things Russian. In that vast domain the whole drama of the race seems to be unfolding itself, and all men feel somehow as if they were a part of it, suffering with it, hoping with it, despairing with it. Every one would gladly help the country through the birth-throes which are evidently upon it. But who knows what to do, or how to do it?

Through the darkness and gloom of the situation two things seem to be fairly clear: One is that the system of arbitrary domination by brute force has proved a flat failure. Russia has long had a standing army of more than a million men, the biggest that any government ever kept permanently upon its feet. She was supposed to be invincible and without fear. Suddenly she has found herself unable without to cope with a power supposed to be only about third class. Within she is full of disorder, unrest and sedition, and all her mighty hosts have found themselves unable to keep the peace within her borders. Dynamite is answered with dynamite. Terror surrounds the throne; officials of the government are slain in the streets. She is reaping the violence and fear which she has sown, and the crop is growing larger at each successive harvest. Her strength has become her weakness. Her vitality has been eaten away, her coherence destroyed, by the gigantic militarism with which her autocratic government has surrounded itself.

The lesson? If she does not abandon her course, admit the people to their inherent rights, shake off the militaristic incubus which is dragging her down, and begin to govern by right, justice, love and trust, the doom of the monarchy, with everything that surrounds it, is sealed, and the time is not long. The lesson of history is fast repeating itself in her case, that the sword — brutal might that is armed with no matter what scientifically perfected rifles, dynamite